by Max Barry

Latest Forum Topics

Advertisement

1

DispatchFactbookPolitics

by The Federal Republic of Daulmark. . 4 reads.

Svyetlachytsa Attacks

January 2024 Svyetlachytsa Attacks
January 2024 Svyetlachytsa Attacks

Location

Svyetlachytsa, Levastok

Date

23:00 (ENC) 12 January 2024

Target

1. Svyetlachytsa train station
2. Svyetlachytsa metro station
3. Svyetlachytsa commercial high street (exterior)

Attack type

Mass shooting, mass murder, suicide bombing, hostage taking

Weapons

WTAR A1, WTAR A1C, TATP suicide belts

Deaths

127 + 8 attackers

Injured

At least 309

Victims

Civilians

Perpetrators

Front for the Liberation of Sarrebol (FOS)
Muharibillah (Uklat cell)

No. of participants

9

Motive

- Retaliation against Daulmārkian government for failure to rescind 2023 territorial annexations

- Retaliation against Daulmārkian government for foreign policy in relation to Zawasuli religion

The attackers killed 127 people, including 19 in the high street outside the intended target. Another 309 people were injured, almost 100 critically. Eight of the attackers were also killed. The attacks were the deadliest in metropolitan Daulmārk since the Levastok bombings of winter 1971-1972.

The Front for the Liberation of Sarrebol (Fronta za Osvoboditev Sarrebol) claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying that it was retaliation for Daulmārk’s new government maintaining the territorial expansions made by the fascists a year prior. The president of Daulmārk, Artur Hohenbeck, said the attacks were an act of war by separatists and foreign terrorist organisations.
The attacks were planned and organised by a Muharibillah terrorist cell based in Uklat, northern Daulmārk. Two of the attackers were Hezykh, but most were born in Sarrebol and had fought to defend the region from the Eastern Succession Plan.



Top: Flag of the Sarrebol region (coat of arms variant), also used by separatists.
Bottom: Muharibillah flag, used universally by all affiliated cells.

In response to the attacks, a three-month state of emergency was declared across the country to help fight terrorism, which involved the banning of public demonstrations, and allowing the police to carry out searches without a warrant, put anyone under house arrest without trial, and block websites that encouraged acts of terrorism or separatism. Dušan Belsek, former director of the National Counterterrorism Centre, said the attacks demonstrated a sophistication as seen reflected in the 2023 Stafford Attacks, and that it would change how major nations regarded the threat altogether. On 13 January, Daulmārk proposed the FORCE Act to the Security Council of the Avaris Accords, a legislation to aide the combat against terrorist organisations everywhere.

On 18 January, the suspected lead operative of the attacks, Fatmir Deman al-Bahri, was killed in a police raid in Yirtsk, along with two others.

Table of Contents

1. Background
2. Attacks
3. Perpetrators
4. Casualties
5. Response

-

-

-

-

-

-

Background


Leading up to the 27 December presidential election, various militant groups had given public warning demanding the complete dismantling of the Ordina, with the threat of violent separatist activity to follow otherwise.

Sarrebol is a formerly disputed region between Daulmārk and Leasath. Daulmārk and the former People’s Republic of Ruzkovia both claimed that the region was rightfully Ruzkovian territory, and eventually Daulmārkian following the Ruzkovian assimilation of 2022. Leasath, however, affirmed that the region belonged to them. This claim was backed by Feuraxia, Leasath’s closest historical ally. The territorial dispute was never hostile, but was suspected to be the likely cause of any eventual conflict between Daulmārk and Feuraxia.

Attacks


Three groups of men launched multiple distinct attacks within the same area: three suicide bombings in one attack, a fourth suicide bombing in another attack, and shootings at several locations in the aftermath.

The initial attacks had been coordinated for 23:00, at which point the first bag left near the general waiting area was detonated, killing an estimated 29 and seriously injuring many around the area. Three attackers waited at the main front entrance of the train station for the fleeing crowd, whilst two more impersonating technical maintenance staff had gained access to the exterior platforms at the rear. Security camera footage shows that the attackers did not stick to fixed positions, but rather moved around the building at their own leisure during the initial execution.


At 23:08, armed police and the first of the OSTZ (anti-terrorism) responders arrived and entered the building. The attackers were divided between escaping down the escalators into the metro stations below, and the high streets outside the train station. As each attacker attempted to flee, they continued firing at civilians both in the metro stations and patrons of the high street’s many cafés and restaurants with exterior seating. The only surviving attacker, who’s explosive vest had malfunctioned, was wounded in the subway station whilst attempting to escape down the tunnels and was quickly apprehended. The rest were killed either by armed responders or self-detonation.

According to the Levastok prosecutor, the attackers wore suicide vests that used acetone peroxide as an explosive. Daulmārkian police reports on cellphones recovered from crime scenes suggested the attacks were being coordinated in real time from Sarrebol, southern Daulmārk, the location of origin of the terrorist cell that most of the attackers were members of.

Perpetrators


Three groups, comprising three men each, executed the attacks. They wore explosive vests and belts with identical detonators. Eight of nine perpetrators died at the scenes of their attacks.

On 13 January, the Front for the Liberation of Sarrebol claimed responsibility for the attacks. Artur Hohenbeck released a statement claiming that the FOS had help from a Muharibillah cell in Uklat, in the far-north of Daulmārk. Claimed motives were the retaliation for maintaining post-2023 annexed territories, and the foreign policy of Hohenbeck in relation to followers of the Zawasul religion.

By 14 January, the focus of the Daulmārkian investigation turned to Fatmir Deman al-Bahri, the radical Zawasulist believed to be the leader of the plot, who was killed four days later in a raid of an undisclosed location in Levastok along with two brothers stated to be working with him.

Most of the attackers were Daulmārkian citizens of Leasathian (Sarrebol) backgrounds. Two other attackers were Hezykh-Daulmārkian. According to the Daulmārkian prime minister, Felix Blaustein, several of the perpetrators had exploited the recent closure of the many checkpoints implemented by the Zakzurts to enter the area undetected.

Tertanian Police Joint Commissioner Ryan Keyes pointed out the similarities in methodology to the 2023 Stafford Attacks (which were also organised by a Muharibillah cell operating out of Kyrate) as having several targets, shooting indiscriminately, the use of improvised explosive devices, and how the attackers killed themselves as soon as capture seemed imminent.

Evidence points to the attackers having regularly used encrypted communications during the planning of the attack.

Casualties


The attackers killed 127 victims and injured 309, with 60 to 80 taken to hospital in serious condition. Of the dead, 71 died in the train station, 37 in the underground subway stations below, and 19 more in the populated commercial area outside.
Hours before the attacks, Levastok’s doctors had practiced a mass shooting emergency response rehearsal.
Various victims were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.

Response


President Hohenbeck issued a statement where he vowed to "mercilessly" fight against terrorism. He chaired an emergency meeting of the cabinet that night and directed his national security council to meet the next morning. The authorities urged the residents of Levastok to stay indoors for their own safety and declared a state of emergency.

On 13 January, Hohenbeck convened a special Congress of the National Council to address the attack and lay out legislative and diplomatic plans he wanted to take in response to them.
These proposals included the creation of the FORCE Act for the General Assembly of the Avaris Accords to better prevent repetitions of the 2023 Stafford Attacks and 2024 Svyetlachytsa Attacks.

RawReport